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1. Introduction 
The grammar of English provides a broad array of elliptical constructions, where 
what is communicated goes beyond what is explicitly stated. One example of 
this is verb phrase ellipsis, in which a verb phrase is elided, its position marked 
only by an auxiliary verb. It is generally agreed that VP ellipsis is governed 
by an identity condition, to the effect that an identical copy of the antecedent 
is "reconstructed" at the ellipsis site. A basic question arises as to whether the 
identity condition is to be stared in syntactic or semantic terms. 
There is a well known body of evidence which indicates that VP ellipsis 
is governed by a semantic identity condition. Consider the following example 
(Sag and Hankamer (1982)): 
(1) 	 A: Do you think they will like me? 
B: Of course they will. 
Here, the only reading of the elliptical VP is "like you"; this preserves the 
meaning of the antecedent "like me", but it requires that the target and antecedent 
VP are not syntactically identical. Similarly, examples such as 
(2) 	 Wendy is eager to sail around the world and Bruce is eager to climb 
Kilimanjaro, but neither of them can because money is too tight. 
have been taken to indicate that inference is sometimes required to resolve 
VP ellipsis, or at least that VP ellipsis must be defined at the level at which 
inferential relations are definable (Webber (1978)). In sum, it appears that VP 
ellipsis interacts in a fundamental way with external, non-linguistic mechanisms 
such as indexicality and inference, which suggests that it must be dealt with at 
a semantic level. 
The most prominent account of VP ellipsis is the "logical form identity 
theory", due independently to Sag (1976) and Williams (1977). While this theory 
has sometimes been described as a semantic theory, Partee and Bach (1981) 
observe that it violates a basic requirement imposed by Montague: namely, that 
the "logical form" language must be "dispensable". The LF identity theory 
requires that the LF representation of the elided VP be equivalent to that of the 
1 I am indebted to Robert Frank, Aravind Joshi, Shalom Lappin, Mats Rooth, Ivan Sag, and 
Bonnie Webber for valuable discussion and suggestions. 
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antecedent VP, up to alphabetic variance. This has the effect of requiring that a 
variable bound outside the antecedent VP be bound by the same token operator 
in the target. As Partee and Bach point out, this requirement is dependent on 
"global properties of the IL (intensional logic) representation". This appears to 
violate compositionality as well as the dispensability of the IL representation 
language. 
The essential point here is that the meaning of a VP cannot be taken simply 
to be a property; a VP determines a property only relative to a given context. 
If there is a variable free within the VP, the VP meaning does not determine 
the value of that variable. So there is no reason to assume that the variable 
would receive the same value in the antecedent context and the target context, 
and indeed, the Montagovian framework does not permit the statement of such 
a requirement. But this is precisely what is required by the LF identity theory. 
The following dilemma presents itself: while there are a variety of facts that 
appear to require a semantic identity condition, the widely accepted Sag/Williams 
LF identity theory is incompatible with standard model-theoretic approaches to 
semantics. In this paper, I will argue that the LF identity condition can be 
rejected in favor of a semantic condition. Using examples involving pronouns 
free within the antecedent VP, I show that the LF identity condition is violated. 
Next, I sketch a dynamic system of semantic interpretation in which the identity 
condition is formulated. I examine additional cases involving variables within 
the antecedent VP: indexical pronouns, traces, and reciprocals. The semantic 
identity is shown to apply in all these cases, while a syntactic identity is enforced 
in none of them. 
Next I look at a "discourse effect" in VP ellipsis, that of "combined an-
tecedents". In the current proposal, the semantic identity condition is mediated 
by a discourse model, much as pronominal anaphora is taken to be mediated by 
a discourse model. That is, the antecedent causes an associated semantic object 
to be stored in a discourse model, to be accessed by a subsequent anaphoric ex-
pression. It is well known that combinations of distinct entities in the discourse 
model can become available as antecedents for plural pronouns. I argue that an 
analogous phenomenon is evidenced with VP ellipsis; that is, combinations of 
distinct properties can become available as antecedents for VP ellipsis. Finally, 
I examine and reject two arguments that have been given in favor of alternative 
syntactic approaches. 
2. The Logical Form Identity Theory 
The logical form identity theory was proposed independently by Sag (1976) and 
Williams (1977). A basic principle in this account is the Derived Verb Phrase 
rule (Partee (1975)), which allows a VP to be represented at Logical Form (LF) 
as a lambda expression in which the subject is lambda-abstracted. Given this 
representation, an identity condition follows from the lambda calculus itself: this 
147 
is the notion of an alphabetic variant. Two lambda expressions are alphabetic 
variants if they differ at most in the naming of bound variables. Applied to VP 
ellipsis, this condition requires that the antecedent and target VP's must match 
exactly in the names of any free variables. 
A free variable in the antecedent VP is either bound by an operator outside 
the VP, or it is "globally free". The LF identity theory requires that a globally 
free variable must refer to the same object in antecedent and target. A variable 
bound by an operator O outside the VP in the antecedent must be bound by 
0 in the target as well. This requirement is also imposed in the higher order 
matching approach of Dalrymple et al. ( 1991 ). 
In fact, this restriction can be violated in a variety of ways, as shown by 
the following examples2 : 
(3) 	 Every boy; in Bill's class wanted Mary to kiss him,, but three boys! 
in John's class actually asked her to [kiss himJ], 
(bound - bound) 
(4) 	 Every boy; thinks Professor Davidson will like his; work, but in 
Bill's! case, I think she actually will [like hisi work]. 
(bound - free) 
(5) 	 Speaking of Mary;, John asked her; out. 
Really - I'm surprised that any girl! would want him to [ask heri 
out]. 
(free - bound) 
(6) 	 If Tom; was having trouble in school, I would help him;, 
On the other hand, if Harryi was having trouble, I doubt that I would 
[help himj], 
( free - free) 
These examples show that a variable can be bound by distinct operators in 
antecedent and target ("bound-bound"), or it can be bound in one and free in the 
other, or indeed, free in both, with distinct referents. It appears, then, that the 
binding of a pronoun by a particular token operator is not part of the identity 
condition governing VP ellipsis. This is a welcome conclusion, as it allows us to 
reject the LF identity condition in favor of an identity condition defined purely 
in terms of model-theoretic denotations of VP's. I now turn to the definition of 
such an identity condition. 
3. A Semantic Identity Condition 
In this section, I sketch an approach to semantic mterpretation in which the 
identity condition on VP ellipsis is formulated. The approach is a dynamic one, 
2 In these examples, the elided material is displayed in brackets. 
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as developed in Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp (1981), Heim (1982)) 
and related theories. In a dynamic approach, meanings are taken to be relations 
on discourse contexts. The meaning of a VP in this approach is a three place 
relation on a property, an input discourse model, and an output discourse model. 
This means that a VP expresses a certain property only relative to a particular 
discourse context. 
3.1. A System of Semantic Interpretation 
The semantic interpretation system I will adopt is based on The Incremental 
Interpretation System (Pereira and Pollack (1991)), which is a computational 
implementation of the dynamic approach. One difference between this approach 
and other dynamic systems is the use of assumption storage and discharge. This 
is essentially the mechanism of Cooper storage (Cooper (1983)) for quantifier 
scope, but it is applied here to a much broader range of phenomena. 
A semantic object is represented as a pair, consisting of a (possibly empty) 
assumption set, and a sense. Each assumption encodes a dependency on context, 
while the sense can be thought of as an ordinary truth-conditional meaning 
representation. Taken together, the assumption:sense pair represents the file 
change potential of an expression, just as in other dynamic systems. However, 
there is a certain flexibility of derivation which distinguishes this system from 
others. For example, a pronoun represents a constraint on the input discourse 
model, requiring the existence of an appropriate individual. In this system, this 
constraint is not necessarily applied to the input discourse model at the point 
when the pronoun is encountered in the derivation. An assumption is stored at 
that point, which may be discharged at some later stage in the derivation. Each 
assumption will be represented as a triple, <x,T,P>, where x is a parameter, T 
is the assumption type, and P represents constraints on the parameter x. The 
assumption can be thought of as an instruction for determining the contextual 
meaning of the associated parameter. 
Below, I will give simplified versions of Pereira and Pollack's treatment of 
quantifiers, indefinites, and pronouns. Then I give a semantic account of VP 
ellipsis, using similar mechanisms. 
3.1.1. Quantifiers 
The treatment of quantifiers in the Incremental Interpretation system essentially 
duplicates that of Cooper (1983). A quantified NP is represented by storing 
a quantifier assumption, together with a parameter representing the sense. At 
some later stage in the derivation, the quantifier assumption is discharged, de-
termining the scope of the quantifier, and capturing the parameter. There are 
two general rules for quantifiers, governing the introduction and discharge of 
quantifier assumptions. A quantified NP is represented as: 
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{<x,q,n> }: x 
where x is a parameter, q is the quantifier, and n is the common noun. For 
example, "every jet" is represented: 
[every = { <x,every,jet> }: x 
The discharge of a quantifier assumption is represented as follows: 
{<x,q,s> }: p, :(q s x) p 
For example: 
{<x,everyjet> }: fly(x) '* : (every jet x) fly(x) 
That is, the quantifier is discharged at some point in which a object of type t 
(proposition) has been constructed, thus determining the scope of the quantifier. 
The restricted quantifier is prefixed to the sense to express this. 
3. 1.2. Indefinites: Evoking Entities 
In DRT and related approaches, an indefinite NP evokes a new entity in the 
discourse model. In the Incremental Interpretation system, an indefinite is rep-
resented as the following assumption-sense pair: 
ra man] = x, indef, MAN >} :x 
The sense is simply the parameter x. The assumption represents an instruction 
to create a new entity of the appropriate type. This is achieved by the eventual 
discharge of the assumption, as follows: 
{A, 	<x, indef, P>}: s A:s[e/x}  
such that e )- DM,n AND P(e) AND e c DM 0 ,,;  
In this case, an entity e is determined, subject to the constraint that it be a "new" 
entity (not in the input discourse model), and that P holds of e. 
3. 1.3. Pronouns: Accessing Entities 
The semantic representation of the pronoun "he" is as follows: 
[he] {< x, var, MALE>}: x 
The assumption includes the parameter name x, the assumption type "var", 
and the constraints ("MALE") placed on the object. The discharge of a "var" 
assumption is: 
1SO 
{A, 	<x, var, P>}: s =;, A:s[e/x]  
such that e e DM1n AND P(e) AND DM,n = DM0 ,,1  
Here, the entity e must be an element of DM;n, and the constraint P must hold 
of e. (Another possibility is that x is "captured" by a quantifier. The details of 
this are not of interest here.) 
3.2. Rules for VP Ellipsis 
In this section, I give rules for VP ellipsis, on an analogy with the rules given 
above for pronominal reference. 
3.2.1. Verb Phrases: Evoking Properties 
Just as indefinite NP's evoke entities, a VP evokes a property. I define a new 
assumption type to implement this, termed "pred". For example, the VP "help 
him" is represented: 
[help him] = { <P, pred, TRUE >, < x, var, MALE > }: help(_, x) 
There are two assumptions: in addition to the "var" assumption associated with 
the pronoun, there is a "pred" assumption associated with the verb. The pred 
assumption has a parameter P, it is of type "pred", and the constraints are simply 
"TRUE", i.e., no constraints are imposed. (Perhaps aspectual features might be 
relevant here for the "pred" assumption, but this will not be dealt with here.) 
The discharge of the "pred" assumption is defined as follows: 
{A, <P,pred,TRUE> }: s =;, A:s  
such that A:s e DMout AND s must be of type "property''  
Upon discharge, the "pred" assumption causes the current semantic represen-
tation of the VP to be added to the discourse model. Note that undischarged 
assumptions may be stored as part of the VP meaning. This allows a "sloppy" 
reading for pronouns within the antecedent VP. 
3.2.2. VP Ellipsis: Accessing Properties 
Just as a pronoun accesses an entity stored in the discourse model, an elliptical 
VP accesses a property. An assumption type "epred" ("elliptical predicate") is 
introduced for this purpose, as shown in the following example: 
[did] = { <P, epred, TRUE > }: did 
The discharge of the "epred" assumption is given as follows: 
---
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:help(l,Tom) 
h•IPL.Tom) 
disen-var " 
Ent:{Tom)  
Prop:( ... {<x,var,MALE:>}:helpL,x))  
{cx,var,MALE,.}:helPL,x) z:;:m) I dl•eh-pr•d 
(<P,pred,TAz:.var,MALE>}:helPL,x) 
If Tom was having trouble in school , I would help h,m. 
doubt(I, help(I, Harry)) 
'-.. 
:he•p(l,Harry) 
:helpL,H•rr'Y) 
I dlsc:h-vllr 
{-cx,var,MALE:,,.}:helpL,X)  
Ent:{Harry,Tom}  
Prop:( ... (-c:x,v11r,MAt.E>}·helpL,X})  
:h•vfng•trouble(Harry)  Ent:{Harry,Tom)  
Prop:{ .. (<x,var,MAi..E>}:helpL,x)}  
{-cQ,epred,TAUE»}:would ~ 
If Harry waa having trouble. I doub1 would. 
Figure l: Derivation of Example (6) 
{ <P, epred, TRUE > }: did=} A:s  
such that A:s e DM;n AND DM;n = DM 0u1  
Upon discharge, the "epred" assumption accesses some property (represented by 
an assumption:sense pair, A:s) stored in the input discourse model. 
To illustrate the resultant system, a derivation of example (6) is depicted 
in Figure l. Derivation trees of the antecedent and target sentences are given. 
Each node of a derivation tree contains an assumption:sense pair, together with 
the current state of the discourse model (displayed in a box). For brevity, the 
discourse model is sometimes suppressed, as are some derivation steps. The 
antecedent VP "help him" is represented by the assumption:sense pair 
{<P, pred, TRUE>, < x, var, MALE>}: help(_, x) 
The assumptions could be discharged in either order. In the depicted deriva-
tion, the "pred" assumption is discharged, causing the VP meaning to be added 
to the discourse model, with the "var" assumption as yet undischarged. Next, 
the "var" assumption is discharged, selecting "Tom" in the current discourse 
model, and the derivation proceeds to construct the representation help(I,Tom). 
Now consider the elliptical VP "would". Here, the "epred" assumption is dis-
charged, selecting the property associated with "help him" from the discourse 
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model. Next, the "var" assumption is discharged, this time selecting "Harry" 
from the current discourse model. 
It should be clear that the readings in examples (3) to (5) can be similarly 
derived. In each case, there is a free variable within the antecedent VP. To derive 
the "sloppy" reading, the assumption for the variable is undischarged when the 
VP meaning is stored in the discourse model, allowing the variable meaning to 
be determined independently in the antecedent and target contexts. 
Next, I examine cases with other types of variables within the antecedent 
VP. I begin with the case of indexical pronouns. 
4. lndexicals 
In example (1), repeated below, I argued that it is the meaning of the antecedent 
"like me" that is preserved under ellipsis, rather than its syntactic representation3 • 
(7) A: Do you think they will like me? 
B: Yes, I think they will. 
As mentioned above, the only reading is "I think they will [like you]". 
This is because of the special nature of indexical pronouns, such as "me". Like 
other uses of pronouns, indexicals determine an individual in context, based 
on constraints such as number, gender, and the like. What is special about 
indexicals is that they contribute an individual, rather than a selection-function, 
to the meaning of an expression. 
This is a widely accepted semantic distinction between indexicals and other 
referential terms, most familiar from the work of Kaplan. Once this distinction 
is incorporated into our semantic interpretation system, the semantic identity 
condition gives the desired results for VP ellipsis. 
This treatment of indexicals has been illustrated by contrasting an indexical 
"I'' with an equivalent referential term: "the speaker". (Nunberg (1991)) 
(8) I could have been a contender. 
(9) The speaker could have been a contender. 
Consider an utterance of these sentences by John Smith. While example (9) 
could be made true by a (possible) state of affairs in which the speaker was 
someone other than John Smith and was a contender, this would not make 
example (8) true. 
In the current system, this difference is treated by imposing a special require-
ment on indexicals, namely, that the associated assumption must be discharged 
3 Based on examples such as these, Sag and Hankamcr (1984) sketch a model•theoretic 
identity condition on VPE that is rather similar in spirit to the current theory. See also Fodor 
and Sag {1984), and Sag {1981). 
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immediately, replacing the parameter with the denoted individual. This require-
ment, which reflects a general semantic fact about indexicals, gives the desired 
result in the VP ellipsis case. 
The indexical "me" is represented: 
[me]= {<x,var(index),SPEAKER> }:x 
Before combining with the verb "like", the assumption must be discharged, 
replacing the parameter with the current speaker, whom I will call "Smith". 
Thus the only possible antecedent for the elliptical VP will be 
{} :like(_, Smith) 
So the only possible meaning for the elliptical VP is "like Smith". 
5. Other Variables 
I have argued that a pronoun is semantically associated with a free variable, 
together with an assumption expressing constraints on its eventual referent. I 
will now examine two cases in which variables are introduce by alternative 
syntactic forms: first, I look at the case of traces, where a variable is unexpressed 
syntactically, under familiar syntactic constraints. Then, I look at reciprocals, 
where a variable is introduced, again together with syntactic constraints. In each 
case, the syntactic constraints are not enforced under ellipsis. 
5.1. Traces 
In the following examples, the antecedent VP contains a trace in a relative 
clause. 
(10) 	 He took the job that no one wanted [e], and got the girl that everyone 
did. (from ad for the film "Career Opportunities") 
(11) 	 China is a country that Joe wants to visit [el, and be will too, if he 
gets an invitation there soon. (Webber 78) 
(12) 	 China is a country that Joe doesn't want to visit [e]. India is a 
country that he does, and he will, when he saves enough money for 
a ticket. 
In example (10), the antecedent is "wanted [e]". In the target, the trace is 
bound by a distinct relative-clause forming operator. On the LF identity theory, 
the trace in the target would have a different index from that in the antecedent, 
violating alphabetic variance. In examples (11) and (12), there is a trace in the 
antecedent, although the target is not within a relative clause, and a syntactic 
trace would not be permitted. I will assume that there are syntactic constraints 
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governing the distribution of traces, and that these constraints are not imposed in 
the semantics. Semantically, traces will simply be treated as variables dependent 
on context in much the same way that pronouns are; that is, they introduce a 
"var" assumption. The only difference is that, for traces, there are no semantic 
constraints (eg, number/gender) on the eventual referent. 
[[e]] = { < x, var, TRUE >}: x 
[visit [el] { < x, var, TRUE >}: visit(_, x) 
This treatment allows examples (10) - (12), in which the trace in the an-
tecedent is either bound differently in the target, or becomes a free variable. 
Webber (1978) suggests that example (11) involves an inference of the follow-
ing form: 
China is a country that Joe wants to visit ::;, Joe wants to visit China. 
In her account, the inferred sentence provides the appropriate antecedent for the 
elliptical VP ("visit China"). 
A new inference schema would be required to account for example (12), 
since the trace refers to China in the antecedent, but India in the target. The 
current account provides an explanation for all three examples without any appeal 
to inference. 
These examples suggest that, under ellipsis, traces are relatively uncon-
strained. This accords with the semantic treatment of a VP with a trace given 
here. It is difficult to imagine a syntactic identity condition, whether at a Surface 
Structure or Logical Form level, which would be consonant with these examples. 
5.2. Reciprocals 
Next, I turn to cases in which the antecedent VP contains a reciprocal. Recip-
rocals impose two syntactic constraints: they must be locally bound, and they 
require a plural subject. In the following example, the target occurs in a context 
where both these requirements are violated. 
(13) 	 Irv and Martha wanted to dance with each other, but Martha couldn't, 
because her husband was there. (Webber 1978) 
It is generally held that reciprocal expressions apply a predicate distribu-
tively (cf. Bennett (1974), Heim, Lasnik and May (1991)): in this case, the 
predicate is A x.dance(x,y). The free variable y is fixed by context. The predi-
cate for the antecedent "dance with each other" is semantically represented: 
[dance with each other D= {< y, var, Q > }: dance(_,y)  
(where Q requires y to be salient in context)  
1SS 
In example (13), this predicate is applied distributively to Irv and Martha 
in the source, and applied to Martha in the target, where Irv is a salient referent 
for the parameter y. 
Now consider the following variants: 
(14) 	 *Irv and Martha wanted to dance with each other. Susan couldn't, 
because her husband was there. 
(15) 	 Irv and Martha wanted to dance. Susan couldn't, because her hus-
band was there. 
(16) 	 Mr. and Mrs. Smith were tango champions last year. This year Mr. 
Smith and Mrs. Jones were going to dance with each other. Mrs. 
Smith couldn't, because of a sprained ankle. 
Example (14) is infelicitous, since the referent corresponding to Susan's 
partner is not salient. This contrasts with example (15), involving "intransitive" 
dance. Here, there is no requirement that the "partner" be salient. Finally, 
example (16) is markedly better than (14), simply because it is pragmatically 
clear who the partner for Mrs. Smith would be. 
The syntactic constraints imposed by reciprocals are clearly not imposed 
under ellipsis; I have suggested that there is a pragmatic constraint that the free 
variable must have a salient referent. Since it is less stringent than the syntactic 
constraint, this constraint only becomes observable under ellipsis. 
6. A Discourse Effect: Combined Antecedents 
There are cases of VP ellipsis in which the antecedent is combined from two 
or more separate VP's. This presents a problem for a syntactic account of VP 
ellipsis, since there is no syntactic object consisting of the combination of two 
separate VP's. If antecedent properties are stored in the discourse model, as I 
am suggesting, the possibility of combined antecedents for VP ellipsis is not 
surprising. For example, it is well known that combinations of entities can 
become the antecedent for a plural pronoun, giving rise to the following sort of 
discourse rule: 
{x ... y ... } =;, {x ... y ... [x,y]} 
This rule has the effect of adding a combination of x and y to a discourse model 
containing the entities x and y, as required by examples such as the following: 
(17) 	 John arrived in the morning. Mary arrived in the afternoon. They 
left together in the evening. 
A similar phenomenon is found with VP ellipsis. Consider the following 
example: 
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(18) 	 After the symmetry between left-handed particles and right-handed 
anti-particles was broken by the kaons in the 1960s, a new symmetry 
was introduced which everybody swears is unbreakable. This is 
between left-handed particles moving forwards in time, and right-
handed anti-particles moving backwards in time (none do, in any 
practical sense, but that does not worry theorists too much). From: 
The Economist, 4 August 1990, p.69. Bonnie Webber, p.c. 
The meaning of the elided VP ("none do") is, I take it, "left-handed particles 
don't move forwards and right-handed particles don't move backwards in time". 
The antecedent must therefore consist of a combination of properties associated 
with two VP's: "moving forwards in time" and "moving backwards in time". 
Such an example indicates the necessity for a rule allowing the set of properties 
in the discourse model to be expanded, as follows: 
{P...Q... } => {P ... Q ... [P,Q]} 
That is, if the discourse model contains two properties P and Q, it may also 
contain the property resulting from the combination of P and Q. 
Another example is the following: 
(19) 	 So I say to the conspiracy fans: leave him alone. Leave us alone. 
But they won't. From: The Welcomat, 5 Feb 92,p.25 
Here the meaning of the elliptical VP is: "they won't leave him alone and they 
won't leave us alone". 
This phenomenon has been noted in the literature, in particular by Webber 
(1978), in which the following examples were given: 
(20) a. 	 I can walk, and I can chew gum. 
b. Gerry can too, but not at the same time. 
(21) 	 Wendy is eager to sail around the world and Bruce is eager to climb 
Kilimanjaro, but neither of them can because money is too tight. 
Webber suggests that inference schemas may account for these examples. 
However, it appears that the "combining" operation which is generally available 
for objects in the discourse model is sufficient to account for these examples. 
It remains to. specify the semantics of a combined property. There are at 
least two possibilities: the combined property may be applied to an "ordinary" 
subject, or to a subject that is itself a combination. 
[P,Q] x = Px AND Qx. 
[P,Q] [x,y] =Px AND Qy. 
Example (21), in which combined properties are applied to combined enti-
ties, is derived as follows. The elliptical VP "can" is represented as the com-
bination of the properties denoted by "sail around the world" and "climb Kili-
manjaro", and the pronoun "them" is also a combination, formed from "Wendy" 
and "Bruce". Ignoring the complication introduced by the quantifier "neither", 
the application of the combined property to the combined entity is: 
[sail around the world, climb Kilimanjaro] [Wendy, Bruce]  
sail around the world(Wendy) AND climb Kilimanjaro(Bruce)  
This account predicts that a "distributed" reading of chis sort is only possible 
when the subject and the elliptical VP both represent combined objects. This 
appears to be the case, as shown by the following example, in which the subject 
of the elliptical VP is not a combination: 
(22) 	 I can walk, and I can chew gum. Harry and John can too.  
(can't mean Harry can walk and John can chew gum)  
It is well known that semantic objects in a discourse model must sometimes 
be combined to serve as the antecedent for subsequent anaphoric expressions. 
These combining operations are clearly beyond the scope of syntactic theories, 
since they can operate on objects in distinct sentences. The fact that similar op-
erations are available for VP ellipsis is therefore strong evidence that VP ellipsis 
cannot be treated syntactically, but rather, in terms of a semantic condition on 
objects stored in a discourse model. 
7. Some Apparent Problem Cases 
In this section, I examine two cases that appear to contradict the predictions 
of this approach. The first case is an example due to Sag ( 1976), in which it 
is argued that the LF identity theory rules out a sloppy reading that would be 
available on my approach. In the second case, it appears that material within the 
elided VP is subject to syntactic binding theory conditions. It has been argued 
that this is evidence that VP ellipsis involves syntactic reconstruction rather than 
a semantic identity condition. 
7.1. An Unavailable Sloppy Reading 
The following contrast was pointed out by Sag (1976): 
(23) 	 John said Mary hit him, and Bill did, too. 
(24) 	 John said Mary hit him, and Bill said she did, too. 
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Sag argues that, while example (23) has both a strict and sloppy reading, 
example (24) permits only the strict reading. This is predicted by the LF identity 
theory, since sloppy readings are only possible for variables that corefer with 
the subject. The same prediction is made by the approach of Dalrymple et 
al. (1991). On the current approach, both readings are permitted, since sloppy 
readings arise from a general interaction with the discourse model, and are not 
restricted to variables that corefer with the subject. 
Whatever the explanation for this contrast, it cannot be explained based 
simply on subject coreference, as in the LF identity theory. This would also 
rule out the following example: 
(25) John said Mary hit him, Bill said she did, and Harry said she did. 
Here, the sloppy reading is available - in fact it seems to be preferred. The 
following example pragmatically requires the sloppy reading, although again 
the sloppy pronoun does not corefer with the subject of the elided VP. 
(26) John, admitted that Mary had bribed him,. 
(27) Bill1 admitted that she had too. [bribed him1 ] 
Similarly the LF identity theory would rule out the following discourse: 
(28) Did anyone admit that Mary had bribed him? 
(29) JOHN admitted that she had. 
On the LF theory, no reading would be possible here, since the pronoun "him" 
must be bound by "anyone" in the target, although it is outside of its scope. 
It may be felt that these examples have a slightly artificial quality. This 
can perhaps be ascribed to the availability of a more concise form, in which the 
matrix VP is elided. In the following examples, the matrix VP cannot be elided, 
because contrastive stress is required within the matrix VP: 
(30) a. John admitted that Mary had bribed him. 
b. Bill didn't ADMIT that she had. He implied it though. 
(31) a. John admitted that Mary had bribed him. 
b. Bill didn't admit that MARY had. But he admitted that SOMEBODY 
had. 
In these examples, only the sloppy reading is possible, and (at least to my 
ear) the artificiality is removed. 
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7.2. Apparent Binding Theory Effects 
Another potential problem with a semantic identity condition relates to binding 
theory effects: it has been argued that binding theory effects are found under 
ellipsis. Given that binding theory conditions are imposed at a syntactic level, 
such effects could not be captured by a purely semantic identity condition. 
Consider the following example (Fiengo and May (1990)): 
(32) * Mary introduced John, to everyone that he, did. 
The infelicity of this example can be explained, according to Fiengo and 
May, by appealing to the Principle C violation of its non-elliptical counterpart: 
(33) * Mary introduced John, to everyone that he, introduced John, to. 
However, there are well-known examples in which binding theory condi-
tions do not apply under ellipsis. The following are grammatical examples whose 
non-elliptical counterparts would be ruled out by binding theory principles: 
(34) (Principle A) Betsy couldn't imagine herself dating Bernie, but Sandy 
could. (Sag 1976) 
(35) (Principle B) Even if George won't, Barbara will vote for him. 
(36) (Principle C) John got to Sue's apartment before she did. (Dalrymple 
(1991)). 
These examples show that binding theory principles do not apply indif-
ferently to elliptical sentences and their non-elliptical counterparts, as would 
be expected under a syntactic identity condition. This suggests that the un-
grammaticality of example (32) results from pragmatic factors specific to that 
example. 
Consider the non-elliptical grammatical counterpart of (32). 
(37) Mary introduced John, to everyone that he, introduced HIMSELF to. 
The example remains awkward, with stress on "himself' facilitating comprehen-
sion. It has frequently been observed that material requiring stress can generally 
not be elided. In general, surprising or "new" material cannot be elided; the fact 
that John had already introduced himself to people that Mary introduced him to 
is certainly new and surprising. 
Consider the following examples: 
(38) Frank couldn't imagine Betsy; dating Bernie, but she, could. 
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(39) 	 Mary didn't consider Bill, to be the best candidate for the job, al-
though he, did.4 
These examples are, according to my informants, completely acceptable, 
although their non-elliptical counterparts violate the binding theory in the same 
way that (32) does. This indicates that, whatever the source of the unaccept-
ability of (32), it is not to be explained by appealing to the binding theory, and 
thus, it does not constitute evidence for syntactic reconstruction. 
8. Conclusions 
There has been a persistent intuition that VP ellipsis involves "sameness of 
meaning" in other words, it is governed by a semantic identity condition. An 
essential feature of meanings is that they are relativized to contexts; once this 
is recognized, it is possible to clearly distinguish between the predictions of a 
semantic identity condition and that of the LF identity theory. The LF identity 
theory requires that elements bound by operators outside the antecedent VP must 
remain bound by the same operator in the target. This ignores the possibility 
that the target context may differ significantly from the antecedent context, and 
in just such cases, the constraints of the LF theory are violated. 
I have shown that a semantic identity condition, suitably formulated in a 
dynamic system, accounts for this phenomenon involving variables that are free 
in the antecedent VP. I have looked at cases involving variables in a wide 
variety of syntactic incarnations, including pronouns, traces, and the variables 
introduced in reciprocal constructions. In all of these cases, semantic identity is 
preserved under ellipsis, even at the expense of changes in syntactic form. 
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